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CONSTITUTIONAL FIDELIY1
Matthew S. Steffey'
As we are reminded with each inauguration, when the President-elect places
one hand on the Bible and raises the other before the Chief Justice of the United
States, Article II requires the President "to solemnly swear" that he will "pre-
serve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."3 Indeed, a simi-
lar sworn duty is a universal feature of government service: Article VI of the
Constitution requires all governmental officers, state and federal, to take an oath
to "support th[e] Constitution."4 Thursday, January 7, 1999, provided a moment
of especially high Constitutional drama as Chief Justice William Rehnquist
asked each Senator to swear, before God Almighty, to "do impartial justice
according to the Constitution."'
How does one discharge such a solemn obligation' and demonstrate fidelity to
her oath and to the Constitution? The first step, naturally, is to determine what
the Constitution means, often a matter of great complexity - and great practical
importance, too. In taking the oath, does one swear fidelity to a Constitution that
embraces our status as the world's only military superpower or one that presup-
poses no standing army?7 One that allows the dollar to serve as the world's cur-
rency or one that bans paper money?8 One that guarantees the liberty to worship
or one that countenances State control of religion?9
My thesis is that any serious effort towards fidelity requires the interpreter to
give the Constitution its best meaning after thoughtfully considering the full
range of interpretive possibilities. To do this, all six sources for Constitutional
interpretation must be brought to bear: arguments based on Constitutional text;
relevant history - notably including the intent of the framers; precedent -judi-
cial and otherwise; the structure of our Constitutional government - especially
the implications of federalism and separation of powers; the political and eco-
nomic consequences of a given interpretation; and our American commitment to
liberty."0 These six sources of Constitutional interpretation date to the founding.
1. This paper was delivered on January 28, 1999, as the 1999 Butler, Snow, O'Mara, Stevens & Cannada
Lecture.
2. Professor of Law, Mississippi College School of Law. B.A., University of South Florida; J.D., Florida
State University; LL.M., Columbia University. I would like to thank the law firm of Butler, Snow, O'Mara,
Stevens & Cannada for their generous support. I would also like to thank Judy Johnson and Mark Modak-
Truran for their helpful and frank comments on the ideas presented here.
3. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
4. See U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 3.
5. See Rule XXIV, Rules and Manual of the Senate, S. Res. 479, 99-2 (1986).
6. The impeachment of President Clinton surely teaches that oath-taking is neither a trivial nor a purely
symbolic matter. Both Articles of Impeachment lodged against him centered around dishonest conduct in the
face of a sworn duty to tell the truth.
7. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cls. 12, 13 (contemplating that Congress shall have occasion, from time to
time, to "raise and support armies' as opposed to permanently "provide and maintain a Navy").
8. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 5 (granting Congress the power merely to "coin" money).
9. See infra notes 22-24.
10. See PHILIP BOBBrrr, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991).
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They have been used from 1787 to the present day, from the Chief Justiceship of
John Marshall to that of William Rehnquist. In fact, they are organic, embedded
features of the interpretive process.11 To attempt to answer complex Constitu-
tional questions by, instead, ignoring this reality and considering only a narrow
range of interpretive sources is frequently impossible and, indeed, absurd.
The Senate impeachment trial of President Clinton illustrates how the text and
the intent of the framers are necessary - but ultimately insufficient - interpre-
tative sources. The Senate has the "sole power" to convict and remove the
President from office for "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Mis-
demeanors."13 Does perjury or obstruction of justice regarding an extramarital
sexual affair (if proven) meet this standard? If we look only to the text or the
framers' understanding, we simply cannot answer the question. Valid arguments
can certainly be made either way.
First, resort to history is absolutely necessary to understand the clause at all. It
is apparent that "misdemeanor" cannot have been used in the modem sense of
trivial crime. Otherwise, the clause would nonsensically read "Treason, Bribery,
or other high Crimes or Trivial Matters."
Indeed, consideration of the text initially leads to the conclusion that treason
and bribery involve betrayal of the powers and duties of the Presidency almost
categorically different than lying about or attempting to thwart an investigation
into an extramarital affair. There seems to be no evidence that President Clinton
abused his official powers to retard the investigation (as by ordering the IRS or
FBI to harass his accusers).
On the other hand, the language seems purposely elastic. Surely the Senate is
meant to have discretion in interpreting the clause. Accordingly, it is entirely
conceivable that purely personal resistance to lawful authority could, in some cir-
cumstances, be so inconsistent with the President's sworn duty to faithfully exe-
cute the law that a reasonable Senate might legitimately remove him. 4 But such
a conclusion must necessarily rest on considerations other than the text or the
framers' understanding of it. The Senate must also consider the structure of our
Constitutional government, the political or economic consequences of a decision
to convict or acquit, and the effect of a conviction or acquittal on our American
commitment to liberty.
The question of whether the Senate should remove President Clinton from
office demonstrates that complex Constitutional questions simply cannot be
answered without consulting the full range of interpretive sources. Nonetheless,
many have tried to adopt an interpretive approach more limited than one which
considers all arguments, those based on text, and history, and precedent, and
structure, and economic and political consequences, and our American commit-
ment to liberty. The most common limiting method is to try and confine the
11. See id.
12. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cls. 6, 7.
13. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
14. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK (1974).
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interpretive inquiry to a conversation about what the framers took or may have
taken Constitutional text to mean. But doing so risks error, and even absurdity.
Consider Chief Justice Taney's opinion in the Dred Scott case, which invalidat-
ed the Missouri Compromise, pushed the country toward the brink of Civil War,
and concluded that persons of African decent were not and could never be citi-
zens of the United States."5 In reaching this final conclusion, Taney reasoned:
No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or feeling...
should induce the court to give to the words of the Constitution a more liberal
construction in their favor than they were intended to bear when the instrument
was framed and adopted .... It is not only the same in words, but the same in
meaning .... Any other rule of construction would abrogate the judicial char-
acter of this court, and make it the mere reflex of the popular opinion or passion
of the day."'
Thus, in Taney's view, the only legitimate insights are those drawn from the text,
as originally understood. Yet, Taney's justification for this conclusion is based on
neither the text of the Constitution nor the intent of those who framed and rati-
fied it. The text says nothing about how it should be read, and there is little evi-
dence that the framers thought that their expectations would govern. 7 Rather, it
proceeds from structural concerns: Taney's conception of the role of the judicia-
ry. A fuller consideration of structural or prudential matters, though, might have
led Taney to an attitude of restraint, instead of activism, which might have led to
a happier place in history. As Justice Scalia has observed:
There comes vividly to mind a portrait by Emanuel Leutze that hangs in the
Harvard Law School: Roger Brooke Taney, painted in 1859, the 82d year of his
life, the 24th of his Chief Justiceship, the second after his opinion in Dred Scott.
He is all in black, sitting in a shadowed red armchair, left hand resting upon a
pad of paper in his lap, right hand hanging limply, almost lifelessly, beside the
inner arm of the chair. He sits facing the viewer and staring straight out. There
seems to be on his face, and in his deep-set eyes, an expression of profound sad-
ness and disillusionment. Perhaps he always looked that way, even when
dwelling upon the happiest of thoughts. But those of us who know how the lus-
tre of his great Chief Justiceship came to be eclipsed by Dred Scott cannot help
believing that he had that case - its already apparent consequences for the Court
and its soon-to-be-played-out consequences for the Nation - burning on his
mind."
15. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
16. Id. at 426.
17. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REv. 885 (1985).
18. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1001-02 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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When your only tool is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. Indeed, the
desire for a limited approach to Constitutional interpretation led former Attorney
General Edwin Meese to explain Brown v. Board of Education in the following
way in an address to the Federalist Society:
When the Supreme Court, in Brown, sounded the death knell for official segre-
gation in the country, it earned all the plaudits it received. But the Supreme
Court in that case was not giving new life to old words, or adapting a "living,"
"flexible" Constitution to new reality. It was restoring the original principle of
the Constitution to constitutional law. The Brown Court was correcting the
damage done 50 years earlier, when in Plessy an earlier Supreme Court had dis-
regarded the clear intent of the Framers of the civil war amendments to elimi-
nate the legal degradation of blacks, and had contrived a theory of the
Constitution to support the charade of "separate but equal"' discrimination.19
Meese's extraordinary assertion is that Brown can be explained by simple ref-
erence to the intent of the framers of the 14th Amendment: in Meese's view,
Plessy wrongly read the framers' intent and allowed segregation; Brown correctly
read the framers' intent and forbade it. But, of course, it is not that easy. The
Brown court itself found the historical record "inconclusive,"2 and, surely, the
very easiest opinion for the Brown Court to write would be one which rested the
outcome on text and history, one which said that Plessy simply misunderstood
the historical record. What, then, would lead Meese to make such a claim? The
concurrence of two things: (1) a desire to uphold the result in Brown; and (2) an
unbending commitment to justify Brown and all other Constitutional conclusions
only by reference to the framers' understanding of the text.
A close look at Brown and Plessy paints a different picture. In setting out the
doctrine of separate but equal, the Plessy Court reasoned that:
If the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the result of
natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other's merits, and a voluntary
consent of individuals .... Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts,
or to abolish distinctions based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do
so can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present situation. 1
By the time Brown was decided, our nation had embraced a very different, very
activist view of government. How could a government of minimum wage laws,
child labor laws, social security, and countless other social welfare measures be
completely incapable of addressing the problem of segregation.22 The Brown
Court realized this. They wrote:
19. THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION (1986) 36-38 (1986) (speech to the
Washington, D.C. Federalist Society) (emphasis added).
20. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954).
21. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544, 551-552 (1896).
22. See BRUCE AcKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
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In approaching the problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the
Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.
We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its
present place in American life throughout the Nation ....
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local gov-
ernments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for
education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to
our democratic society .... Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environment.
23
It was not the Court's understanding of the framers' intent that had changed. It
was not the reality of segregation that had changed. It was not even the Court's
moral resolve that explains the change. Rather, it was the Court's changed con-
ception of what government could do about segregation that made the difference:
the Plessy Court viewed government as powerless concerning racial attitudes,
while the Brown Court viewed government as a principal instrument for inculcat-
ing cultural values.
The Wallace v. Jaffree case provides what may be the paradigmatic example of
the absurd Constitutional universe inhabited by those with interpretive tunnel
vision. Wallace v. Jaffree involved a challenge in federal court to three Alabama
school prayer laws. At a hearing on the plaintiff's request for a preliminary
injunction, Chief Judge William Brevard Hand found the "moment of silence"
statute constitutional, but entered a preliminary injunction against the other two
statutes. While the trial on the merits did not change Judge Hand's understand-
ing of the statutes, what he considered newly discovered historical evidence
convinced him that the First Amendment did not apply to Alabama at all and, thus,
the State could establish an official religion if it should so choose.24 The Supreme
Court reversed, naturally, holding that Alabama, no less than the Congress, must
respect the religious liberty of its citizens.2"
For my present purposes, most interesting is Judge Hand's opinion, where he
confronted the fidelity question head on. A section of Judge Hand's opinion,
entitled "proper interpretive perspective," sets forth his thesis.
23. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492-93.
24. Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 554 E Supp. 1104, 1128 (1983).
25. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). Quoting Justice Jackson's famous words, the Court held that
Alabama, no less than the Congress, must respect the basic truth that "'[i]f there is any fixed star in our consti-
tutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."'
Id. at 55 (quoting West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
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The interpretation of the Constitution can be approached from two vantages.
First, the Court can attempt to ascertain the intent of the adopters, and after
ascertaining that attempt apply the Constitution as the adopters intended it to be
applied. Second, the Court can treat the Constitution as a living document,
chameleon-like in its complexion, which changes to suit the needs of the times
and the whims of the interpreters. In the opinion of this Court, the only proper
approach is to interpret the Constitution as its drafters and adopters intended ....
What is a court to do when faced with a direct challenge to settled precedent? ...
[A] rigid adherence to stare decisis "would leave the resolution of every issue in
constitutional law permanently at the mercy of the first Court to face the issue .... "
This Court's review of the relevant legislative history surrounding the adoption
of both the first amendment and of the fourteenth amendment, together with the
plain language of those amendments, leaves no doubt that those amendments
were not intended to forbid religious prayers in the schools which the states and
their political subdivisions mandate.26
Judge Hand's lack of institutional and historical perspective is apparent. It is a
paradoxical notion of judicial restraint that drives a district judge to ignore
decades of Supreme Court precedent against the settled expectations of nearly all
Americans. At a doctrinal level, stare decisis addresses the deference a court
owes its own decisions, not the binding effect of long settled Supreme Court
precedent on a District Court.2 More fundamentally, the complex question of
the meaning of the 14th Amendment simply cannot be settled by reference to its
famously vague and broad text28 or the ambiguous and conflicting historical
record surrounding it. Rather, one must draw on our nation's nearly one hundred
and thirty years of experience since the ratification of the reconstruction Amend-
ments, and the full range of interpretive sources. Judge Hand's interpretive
straight-jacket precluded any chance that he could properly situate his task in
relation to other Constitutional actors, contemporary and historic, with a role in
defining our nation's commitment to religious freedom. His interpretive approach
literally foreclosed any evaluation of the Constitutional achievements of Ameri-
cans since reconstruction.
Perhaps the most notable failure of the Taney-Meese-Hand method is that it
precludes consideration of the Constitutional achievements of other actors, past
26. Jaffiree, 554 F Supp. at 1126-28.
27. Wallace, 472 U.S. 45 at n.26.
28. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, which reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citi-
zens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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and present, and thereby impoverishes our Constitutional history. 9 The amputa-
tion of history is precisely what is problematic with Justice Thomas's views on
federal authority. Consider his concurring opinion in the case of Lopez v. United
States (which, in 1995, for the first time in over 60 years, held that Congress
exceeded its legislative power under the Commerce Clause). Justice Thomas
argued that, beginning in the 1930s, the Supreme Court has strayed far from the
framers' understanding of Congressional authority and that the Court ought to
return to something approaching a 19th century view. In asking for others to
heed his call, Thomas seemed eager to return to the original understanding, but
noted that:
Although I might be willing to return to the original understanding, I recognize
that many believe that it is too late in the day to undertake a fundamental reex-
amination of the past 60 years.30
Thus, Justice Thomas invites us not to evaluate the Constitutional achievements
of this century, but to treat them as irrelevancies.
What might cause Justice Thomas to want to enforce a 19th century view of
federal power and thereby stake out territory as a revolutionary infidel? It cer-
tainly cannot be a commitment to judicial restraint; leading a charge to dismantle
the federal government does not come from a limited and restrained judiciary.
Justice Thomas's interpretive methodology could well call into question the
validity of our standing army, the dollar, the modern administrative state, the appli-
cation of the Bill of Rights to the States, and laws on subjects ranging from child
labor to sexual harassment. Perhaps it is a desire to simplify Constitutional ques-
tions and avoid the complex issues raised by our Constitutional history and prac-
tice. Perhaps it is simply ideology. But, fidelity to the full array of sources for
Constitutional interpretation is often important precisely because it can help dis-
cipline the interpreter's biases and prejudices and promote proper institutional
and historical perspective.
To be sure, faithful interpretation can be hard and personally distressing work.
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter recognized this as they decided whether
to overrule Roe v. Wade. Whatever one thinks about the merit of their conclusion
on the abortion question, they were manifestly committed to faithful process.
Their joint opinion explained their duty in these terms:
It is tempting, as a means of curbing the discretion of federal judges, to suppose
that liberty encompasses no more than those rights already guaranteed to the
individual against federal interference by the express provisions of the first eight
Amendments to the Constitution. But of course this Court has never accepted
that view.
29. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).
30. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 601 at n.8 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
19981
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
It is also tempting, for the same reason, to suppose that the Due Process Clause
protects only those practices, defined at the most specific level, that were pro-
tected against government interference by other rules of law when the Four-
teenth Amendment was ratified. But such a view would be inconsistent with
our law. It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal lib-
erty which the government may not enter. We have vindicated this principle
before. Marriage is mentioned nowhere in the Bill of Rights and interracial
marriage was illegal in most States in the 19th century, but the Court was no
doubt correct in finding it to be an aspect of liberty protected against state inter-
ference by the substantive component of the Due Process Clause in Loving v.
Virginia.
The inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due process claims may
call upon the Court in interpreting the Constitution to exercise that same capaci-
ty which by tradition courts always have exercised: reasoned judgment. Its
boundaries are not susceptible of expression as a simple rule. That does not
mean we are free to invalidate state policy choices with which we disagree; yet
neither does it permit us to shrink from the duties of our office.
Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic principles of
morality, but that cannot control our decision. Our obligation is to define the
liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code. The underlying constitutional
issue is whether the State can resolve these philosophic questions in such a
definitive way that a woman lacks all choice in the matter......
We do not need to say [how] each of us, had we been Members of the [Roe]
Court. . . , would have [decided that case]. The matter is not before us in the first
instance, and coming as it does after nearly 20 years of litigation in Roe's wake we
are satisfied that the immediate question is not the soundness of Roe's resolution
of the issue, but the precedential force that must be accorded to its holding.32
To return briefly to where I began, consider again the task before the Senate
during the impeachment trial of President Clinton. Faithful execution of such a
duty requires a lot of hard work and resort to all six sources of Constitutional
interpretation.
First, Senators should engage the text. They should ask "how great or small is
the similarity between the President's alleged misconduct and treason or
bribery?"
31. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847-50 (1992) (opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
and Souter).
32. Id. at 871.
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Second, Senators should examine history. They should review the federalist
papers and other evidence of the framers' intent and ask "is the President's
alleged misconduct like the kind of official malfeasance the framers considered
impeachable?"
Third, Senators should evaluate precedent. With regard to the precedent for
impeaching a President, they should ask "whether removing President Clinton
from office would be like the failed, and essentially political, effort to remove
President Andrew Johnson?" In regard to the precedent for impeaching federal
judges, they should ask "should the Senate be more or less reluctant to remove
the President than a federal judge?" "Does the fact that Article III states that
judges serve 'during good behavior' provide a different standard?" "Does it mat-
ter that judges are appointed for life, not elected for a term, and the President
will leave office in two years anyway?"
Fourth, Senators should consider the effects of a decision to convict or acquit
on the structure of our Constitutional system of government. They should ask
"would removing the president by a strongly partisan vote move us undesirably
closer to a parliamentary system?" Conversely, "will failing to remove President
Clinton intolerably damage the office of President?"
Fifth, Senators must account for the political and economic consequences of
their decision. They should ask "does the continued, strong, popular support for
the President make impeachment a usurpation of democratic principles?" Or,
alternatively, "would accounting for the polls undermine the republican, repre-
sentative responsibilities of the Senate?"
Sixth, and finally, given that President Clinton is accused of dishonesty con-
cerning consensual sexual conduct, Senators should consider the effect of the
Independent Counsel's investigation and the impeachment proceedings on our
historic commitment to liberty. They should ask "do the methods of the office of
independent counsel threaten the private realm of family life which the state can-
not enter?"
Failure to consider all interpretive sources means that fidelity to the Consti-
tution is replaced with fidelity to a particular result. And the process of
Constitutional interpretation is consequently replaced with an exercise of mere
power.
1998]

